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I. INTRODUCTION
American society has been facing an onslaught of sorts from the rise
in the use of illegal drugs and the improper use of performance-enhancing
drugs such as steroids. It is a violation of federal law to engage in the use
of either any illegal drugs or steroids without a prescription. Cocaine and
amphetamines, the most commonly used drugs, can involve a high degree
of psychological dependence. Other effects include excitation, accelerated
pulse rate, aggressiveness, and the potential for death from cardiac or
respiratory arrest.' Anabolic steroids, which differ from recreational illegal
drug use in that athletes predominantly use them, stimulate muscle growth
and hasten recovery time. However, they also are linked with the adverse
effects of heart disease, stroke, and liver disease.2
As illegal drug use has been ubiquitous in almost every industry and
trade, so is the case in the field of professional athletics-baseball is such
an example. With the large amount of professional baseball players that
have, in recent years, posted a high number of home runs and extra-base
hits, suspicion has grown over the catalyst for this offensive firepower. In
fact, Major League Baseball (hereinafter "MLB" or "League") officials,
coaches, and even some players have generated a public and persistent
sentiment that steroid abuse and other illegal drug use has become a
"widespread" problem in the sport.
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1. Tim Freudenberger, Eliminating Drug Use in Sports: Utilizing Contractual
Remedies, 6 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 2 (1987).
2. James C. McKinley, Jr., Performance Enhancers and Baseball, N.Y. Times on the
Web, at http://www.nytimes.com/2OOO/1O/11/sports/11STER.html (last modified Oct. 11,
2000).
3. Id. (stating that a general manager of one MLB team admitted his belief that one-
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Many private employers have implemented drug-testing programs to
detect employee drug use, and both professional sports leagues and
particular team owners have attempted to impose such a policy. MLB does
not randomly test players for illegal drugs or drugs that may enhance
performance.4 In fact, testing is not allowed under the current collective
bargaining agreement.5 The League is pressing the Major League Baseball
Players' Association (hereinafter "MLBPA") to accept a testing program in
6the next round of collective bargaining. Union leaders, prior to making
any concession, request a scientific study to determine if so-called
"performance-enhancing drugs" actually improve performance.7
The issue of testing again presented a conflict with the expiration of
the most recent collective bargaining agreement on October 31, 2001.'
Random testing for illegal drugs and performance-enhancing substances
has the potential to bring detrimental effects to professional athletes in the
League, both by removing the legitimacy of the players' statistics and by
casting a cloud over MLB. With that, the question of whether drug-testing
is a mandatory issue of collective bargaining, and thus whether the owners
could unilaterally implement a drug-testing program, is closely associated
with the future of MLB. This comment examines: (1) the history of the
issue of drug-testing and collective bargaining in the League; (2) other
professional sports leagues' treatment of the matter of drug-testing; (3)
National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB" or "Board")
decisions, arbitration decisions, and case law precedents supporting the
notion that drug-testing is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and
(4) prevailing reasons for allowing the unilateral implementation of a drug-
testing program by the League. Upon inspection, this issue is one that does
indeed require treatment in good faith collective bargaining by the
employees' union representatives and League management.
II. SURVEY OF PREVIOUS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OVER DRUG-
TESTING IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
A. Evolution of the Major League Baseball Players' Association
The MLBPA was formed in 1954 to give the players a vehicle to
third of the League's players are active users of steroids and one All-Star player believed
that two-thirds of the top players in the National League are using some sort of steroid).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. ROGER 1. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 197 (1998).
2002] DRUG-TESTING AS SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 441
communicate their complaints and suggestions regarding the operation of
the League.9 It was neither a union nor a collective bargaining agent as
recognized under the National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter
"NLRA").'0 Eventually, the MLBPA evolved to become an actual labor
organization, marked by the early stages of collective union activity." The
League's first collective bargaining agreement was drafted in 1968.12 One
year later, the NLRB indicated that it would accept jurisdiction over the
realm of professional sports, including MLB. In American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs & Ass'n of National Baseball League
Umpires, the Board held that professional baseball was an industry in or
"affecting interstate commerce," thus subjecting the industry to the
provisions of the NLRA (including the duty of both sides to collectively
bargain over mandatory subjects).,l The NLRA encourages "the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining," in addition to the right of
management to create multi-employer bargaining units, such as a
professional sports league.
14
B. Previous Collective Bargaining Agreements and Negotiations
In traditional industrial settings, as with professional sports leagues
like MLB, the collective bargaining agreement contains the general
provisions of employment governing the relationship, and thus any
collective agreements, between management (here, the League and team
owners) and employees (the players). This relationship in MLB would be
shaped by various events within the League transpiring over the span of
several years. In the early 1980's, a series of drug-related incidents
plagued the League, requiring MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn to suspend
several players for illegal drug use and possession. 1 An arbitration panel
upheld the Commissioner's actions stating, "there can be no question that
drug involvement by a Major League Ballplayer is not only contrary to
established rules and provisions of the Uniform Players Contract, but also
constitutes a serious and immediate threat to the business that is promoted
9. Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective
Bargaining in Professional Baseball, in BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 245
(Spencer Weber Wailer et al. eds., 1995).
10. Id.
11. Id. at246.
12. Glenn M. Wong & Richard J. Ensor, Major League Baseball & Drugs: Fight the
Problem or the Player?, 11 NovA L. REv. 779,780 (1987).
13. 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 192 (1969).
14. C. Peter Goplerud m11, Collective Bargaining in the National Football League: A
Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 Vii.. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 14 n.8 (1997).
Professional sports leagues that are unionized qualify as multi-employer bargaining units
because each team in the league has a player representative to the union. Id. at 15.
15. Wong & Ensor, supra note 12, at 783-85.
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as our National Pastime.'
6
Bad press relating to these incidents created the need for a uniform
written policy, which would give notice that misconduct related to illegal
drugs would result in rapid and proportionate action. Some owners pushed
for mandatory random drug-testing, while others desired a more flexible
program with intermediate steps of both detection and treatment. 7 In the
June 1984 Collective Bargaining Agreement, MLB and the MLBPA jointly
agreed upon a drug abuse program aimed at illegal drugs, particularly
cocaine (the program excluded marijuana, amphetamines, and even
alcohol).' 8 Under this program, a player voluntarily seeking help would
receive treatment as well as immunity from disciplinary action.19 Players
would be treated and then placed on probation, during which time they
would be tested for illegal substances and could be required to receive
further therapy. 20 Additionally, a club having "reasonable cause" to suspect
a player of drug use could ask that player to undergo an examination. If the
player refused, he would be subject to disciplinary action by the League
Commissioner.2' A year later, new Commissioner Peter Ueberroth deemed
this agreement insufficient and the owners conceded that the program was
altogether ineffective.22 Ueberroth then desired to adopt a comprehensive
and League-wide drug-testing program.23 However, the players rejected
such a plan despite evidence that drug use was affecting player
performance.24 No such agreement was subsequently adopted.2
Ueberroth used the 1985 "Pittsburgh Drug Trials" (a federal drug
probe of professional baseball players) as a catalyst to introduce a random
drug-testing program.26 The program covered League management,
League umpires, and all minor league players, for the controlled substances
of cocaine, heroin, amphetamines, morphine, and marijuana.27 Positive test
results would yield the evaluation and treatment of the individual, since the
stated primary purpose of the program was to deter drug use and not to
punish.28 The Commissioner made a point to emphasize that MLB players
would not be covered under this program.29
16. Id. at 788.
17. Id. at 791.
18. Id. at 792.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Freudenberger, supra note 1, at 2 n.4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Wong & Ensor, supra note 12, at 795.
27. Id. at 796.
28. Id. at 797.
29. Id.
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After the Pittsburgh Drug Trials concluded, Ueberroth made a push
for voluntary drug-testing of all MLB players. The MLBPA rejected the
plan in 1985, objecting to it because they believed drug-testing intrinsically
presumed guilt on the part of the players., 0 It maintained that this program
could not be implemented unilaterally and was indeed a matter suited for
collective bargaining." In 1986, the Commissioner again tried to institute a
drug-testing program for MLB players. Clauses requiring mandatory
random drug-testing were inserted into a segment of individual players'
contracts, which the MLBPA again rejected.32 The players' grievance was
addressed in the decision of In the Matter of the Arbitration Between MLB
Player Relations Committee and MLBPA, which sided with the MLBPA's
claim.33
A 1986 revised "Drug Policy & Prevention Program" placed
substance testing under the control of the Office of the Commissioner, and
has been subsequently revised on occasion by succeeding commissioners.
The Program in its revised form: (1) forbids any random and unannounced
drug-testing and (2) allows for mandatory testing only for players who have
either admitted to drug use or are detected of using illegal drugs.34 There
was a similar stalemate regarding random drug-testing in the most recent
set of collective bargaining negotiations. After the 1990 Collective
Bargaining Agreement expired in December 1993, an agreement was
finally drafted and finalized, after much hostility and litigation, in the 1996
season. This agreement would run through October 2001.
35
After experiments with such initiatives as sanctioning for drug use, a
joint management-players' association drug program, and unilateral League
management proposals, currently no systematic testing program or
disciplinary regime in baseball has been agreed upon through the vehicle of
collective bargaining. Throughout this process, player objections to
mandatory drug-testing have included the notion that testing is an invasion
of privacy, an insult to player integrity, and an ineffective deterrent of drug
use (especially considering there was no scientific data demonstrating
widespread drug use among the League's players).
30. Id. at 802.
3 1. Id. at 798-802.
32. Wong & Ensor, supra note 12, at 804.
33. Id. The details of the arbitration are discussed later in this comment. See supra IV.
A.I.
34. Edward Rippey, Contractual Freedom over Substance-Related Issues in Major
League Baseball, 1 SPORTs LAW. J. 143, 151 (1994).
35. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at 197.
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C. Other Professional Sports Leagues' Treatment of Drug-Testing
1. The National Football League
The National Football League (hereinafter "NFL") management and
the National Football League Players' Association (hereinafter "NFLPA")
inserted language in the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement regarding
drug abuse. The agreement states that, "[t]he parties agree that it is the
responsibility of everyone in the industry to treat, care for and eliminate
,36chemical dependency problems of players." A provision states that a drug
rehabilitation center would be responsible for conducting player education
and providing clubs with vehicles for detection and treatment.37 A team's
physician could, upon "reasonable cause," direct a player to undergo
chemical abuse testing.38 Detected dependency by a player is not sufficient
for disciplinary action; only upon a player failing to adhere to required
treatment will he be disciplined.39 The agreement specifically provides that
there will be no "spot checking" for chemical abuse or dependency by an
NFL franchise.40 It provides only for the testing of "street drugs" and
steroids (as of 1987) on two occasions: upon "reasonable cause" and during
pre-season physicals.4'
2. The National Basketball Association
In the National Basketball Association (hereinafter "NBA"), league
management and the National Basketball Players' Association (hereinafter
"NBPA") agreed upon a drug-testing program, incorporated in Article
XXXIII of the 1984 Collective Bargaining Agreement.42  This contract
establishes a "reasonable cause" procedure. When the NBA or NBPA has
reasonable cause to believe a player "may have been engaged in the use,
possession, or distribution of a prohibited substance," an appointed
expert-accountable to neither the league nor the players association-
36. Freudenberger, supra note 1, at 2 n.4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Jim Thurston, Chemical Warfare: Battling Steroids in Athletics, I MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. 93, 121 (1990) (citing the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National
Football League Players Association and National Football League Management Council,
Art. XXXI, § 7).
42. Paul M. Anderson, Cautious Defense: Should I Be Afraid to Guard You?, 5 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 279, 287 (1995) (citing the National Basketball Association-National Basketball
Players Association Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. XXXIII).
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oversees the drug program and discerns if such reasonable cause does in
fact exist.43 If the expert determines that reasonable cause is present, the
player is required to submit to testing.44 Also under this program, players
who voluntarily seek treatment for either dependency or addiction to
heroine or cocaine will receive it with no attached discipline. 45 Any player
that is either convicted of violating a crime or pleads guilty to a crime
involving the use, possession, or distribution of a prohibited substance is
permanently disqualified from the league.46
I. STATUTES AND CASE LAW ON SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING
A. Relevant Provisions of the NLRA
The NLRA supports the use of collective bargaining between union
representatives of the employees and management. The NLRA asserts the
policy:
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce... by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.47
Section 7 provides all employees with the right to self-organize,
unionize, and collectively bargain about conditions of employment through
union representatives of their own choosing.48 Further, Section 8(d) makes
the employer's duty to bargain with the union mandatory in some cases, as
it states that "to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment."4 9 Additionally, Section
8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
to collectively bargain with the representatives of his employees. 0
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2001).
48. National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2001).
49. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2001) (emphasis added).
50. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2001).
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B. Overview of Mandatory and Permissive Subjects of Bargaining
League management's right to unilaterally implement a drug-testing
regime depends on the characterization of the matter as either a mandatory
or a permissive subject of collective bargaining. The Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Katz declared that it is an unfair labor practice, in violation of
Section 8(a)(5), for an employer to unilaterally change a mandatory subject
of an agreement, as collective bargaining over the matter is required.5'
After all, the NLRA requires both management and the union to negotiate
over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 5 2 The
Supreme Court construed the phrase "terms and conditions" broadly, such
that it is interpreted in light of specific industrial practices. 53
Management must bargain over mandatory subjects and may bargain
over permissive subjects. Classification as a mandatory subject means, for
the purposes of collective bargaining, that it is an unfair labor practice for
either the employer or a union to refuse to good faith bargain about such a
matter at the request of the other party.54 Either party is entitled by statute
to the right of insisting, to the point of impasse,5 on the implementation of
56its own position regarding a mandatory subject . After good faith
bargaining and discussion by both sides leads to an impasse, management
may implement its proposal without the agreement of the union and still
comply with the duty to bargain. 7 The employer need not alter or concede
its position despite classification of a matter as "mandatory," since Section
8(d) states that, "such obligation [to collectively bargain] does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.5 8
Non-mandatory or permissive subjects may be proposed, but neither
party can insist on its position to the point of impasse because these
subjects fall outside the phrase "terms and conditions" and thus are not
statutory. Essentially, management may implement a program
incorporating permissive subjects of bargaining without the concern of
requiring the response of employee representatives or violating the NLRA,
as the employer's refusal to bargain is privileged.59  If a term is non-
51. 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) (holding that an employer cannot announce unilateral
changes, such as granting merit increases and reducing sick leave, without good faith
collective bargaining over the matters).
52. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
53. See First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 (1981).
54. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 410 (1996).
55. "Impasse" can be defined as the point where good faith negotiations have
terminated and neither side is willing to change its respective position in order to reach a
joint agreement. Id. at 374.
56. Idat410.
57. Id. at 412.
58. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2001).
59. Cox, supra note 54, at410.
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mandatory, an employer can impose it upon employees regardless of
whether it was addressed in the collective bargaining agreement.
6
0
Employers also have the ability to exercise managerial prerogative,
thus requiring no collective bargaining, with matters "fundamental to the
basic direction of a corporate enterprise or... [that] impinge only
indirectly upon employment security. 61  Decisions involving product
design, financing, and sales have only a speculative effect on employment,
and thus are permissive subjects. In his concurrence in Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB, Justice Stewart stated,
[n]othing the Court holds today should be understood as
imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such
managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment
capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves
primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of
the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment.62
C. Case Law
The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner
Corp., ruled that a "mandatory subject" qualifies as an issue that vitally
affects employees and about which both the adversaries must bargain in
good faith.63 Further, a party is not obligated to bargain over a non-
mandatory subject.64
Nonetheless, in NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., the Court
previously held that it is lawful for an employer to collectively bargain for
a management rights clause in an employment agreement.65 The NLRB
may not forbid an employer from insisting upon a mandatory subject of
bargaining, because it cannot compel concessions by either party.66
According to the Court, to say that the employer has to share the
determination of employment conditions with the union during the life of
the collective bargaining agreement would interfere too much with the
60. Id.
61. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
62. Id.
63. 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (holding that an employer's insistence on permissive
subjects such as having a ballots clause or a recognition clause in the collective bargaining
agreement is a per se unlawful refusal to bargain).
64. Id.
65. 343 U.S. 395,409 (1952).
66. Id. at 404.
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substantive terms of the agreement. 67 The NLRA only requires that the
parties bargain in good faith, and it is not improper for an employer to
68insist on having some flexible control over conditions of employment.
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, the employer at issue
unilaterally acted in subcontracting work that was currently performed by
maintenance workers in the bargaining unit. The employees within that
unit were subsequently terminated.69 The NLRB held that the employer's
decision dealt with the mandatory subject of subcontracting work, over
which it was required to bargain.70  Established industrial practice
demonstrated that subcontracting work was indeed a term addressed in
previous collective bargaining agreements. 7' The issue of subcontracting
did not affect the "entrepreneurial control" of the employer to manage its
business freely, as the Court determined that this decision did not affect the
company's basic operation or concern its capital structure.72 Neither the
basic scope of the enterprise nor the commitments in investment capital
73
were implicated by subcontracting decisions such as the one at issue.
Further, rules that regulate how employees perform their job were
considered terms and conditions of employment, including health and
safety protections at the workplace. Justice Stewart's concurrence stated
that, "[w]hat one's hours are to be, what amount of work is expected...
[and] what safety practices are observed, would all seem conditions of
one's employment." 74
In the seminal case First National Maintenance Corp.v. NLRB, the
Court addressed an employer who operated a cleaning service for
commercial customers.75 He terminated a bargaining unit of employees
because it affirmatively voted to be represented by a union.76 The Court
held that an employer's decision to terminate a portion of its business for
purely economic motives was not a mandatory subject of bargaining.77 In
its opinion, the Court offered the existence of three types of management
decisions. Mandatory subjects are those that have a direct impact on the
67. Id. at 409.
68. Id. at 408.
69. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
70. Id. at 209.
71. Id. at211-12.
72. Id. at 213.
73. Ethan Lock, The Legality Under the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts by
National Football League Owners to Unilaterally Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U.
FLA. L. REv. 1, 22 (1987).
74. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 222 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
75. 452 U.S. 666, 668 (1981).
76. Id. at 669.
77. Id. at 686.
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employer-employee relationship (i.e., layoffs).78 Permissive subjects are
those that "have only an indirect and attenuated impact on the employment
relationship."79 The third category falls in between these two ends, with
decisions that not only have a direct impact on the employment
relationship, but also involve an economic decision that would change the
scope and direction of the enterprise (this is the category in which the Court
placed the matter in First National).8
For this last category, the Court mandated the application of a
balancing test, where an employer is required to bargain over such
decisions only if the benefits to both labor relations and the collective
bargaining process within the enterprise outweigh the burdens placed on
the employer's ability to operate his business profitably.81 The Court
balanced the employer's need for "unencumbered decision-making" and
the benefit to employee-employer relations.82 First National held that the
employer's need to operate his business profitably was weightier than the
benefits that would come with collective bargaining over this particular
matter."' Thus, primarily economic decisions involving a change in the
scope and the direction of the enterprise are reserved for management. The
NLRB interpreted this issue in Otis Elevator, where the Board upheld an
employer's unilateral action.84 It held that all management decisions
affecting the "scope and direction of an enterprise" are permissive
subjects.
85
IV. ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING THE ISSUE OF DRUG-TESTING IN
BASEBALL
A. Drug-Testing Must be a Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining
1. MLB Arbitration
In a grievance filed by the MLBPA in 1986, the Players' Association
claimed that drug-testing clauses in players' individually negotiated
contracts (agreed to by several hundred players) were contrary to Article II
78. Id. at 677.
79. Id. at 676-77.
80. Id. at 677.
81. Id. at 679.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 686.
84. 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 893 (1984).
85. Id.
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86of the basic collective bargaining agreement. Article II states that the
MLBPA is the "sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all Major
League Players... with regard to all terms and conditions of
employment. 87 A limited exception to this provision exists when there is a
special covenant between the player and his club, providing benefits
beyond those found in the Uniform Player's Contract. The owners
claimed that because the collective bargaining agreement did not mention
the issue of random drug-testing (more specifically that there was no
explicit prohibition of the issue), they should be allowed to use the
contractual powers afforded to them to place individual drug-testing
clauses in players' contracts.
89
Impartial arbitrator Thomas Roberts with In the Matter of the
Arbitration between MLB Player Relations Committee and MLBPA heard
the issue. He held that, in order for a drug-testing clause to be enforceable,
representatives of both the players and ownership must collectively bargain
if the clause does not provide actual or potential additional benefits to the
player.9° Roberts concurred with the MLBPA's claim that these individual
covenants were efforts by the owners to ensure a League-wide drug-testing
program through bypassing the bargaining constraints of Article 11.91
Roberts stated, "[a]ny such clauses must be negotiated with the Players
Association," and thus it is a violation to bypass the MLBPA as the
92players' exclusive bargaining agent.
2. NFL Arbitrations and Cases
Two 1986 arbitrations both suggested that drug-testing is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. In In the Matter of Arbitration among the
National Football League Players Ass'n & the National Football League
Management Council & the National Football League, Arbitrator Kasher
ruled that NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle could not unilaterally impose a
86. Wong & Ensor, supra note 12, at 805 n.132. The clauses stated,
[p]layer agrees to submit to any test or examination for drug use when requested
by the Club and the failure to do so shall make the guarantee set forth in (the
balance of the guarantee provision) null and void. Player is of the opinion that
it is vitally important to him and his professional career that his image not be
tarnished by the specter of drugs. Therefore, player voluntarily agrees to submit
to any test or examination for drug use when requested by the Club.
Id.
87. Id. at 806.
88. Id. at 807.
89. Id.
90. Freudenberger, supra note 1, at 26 n.7.
91. Wong & Ensor, supra note 12, at 806.
92. Id.
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new league-wide drug program that included random drug-testing.93 The
arbitrator determined that this program would constitute an illegal
departure from the collective bargaining agreement because it was
unilaterally implemented without any bargaining or negotiation over the
matter-the agreement's Article XXXI precluded all random drug-testing.94
Rozelle asserted that the drug-testing program was an exercise of his
disciplinary authority preserved within the position of Commissioner in the
1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, and that this "residual disciplinary
authority" overcame any collective bargaining agreement provisions to the
contrary.95 The arbitrator disagreed, stating:
[C]ertain... subject areas, such as drug-testing and the evaluation
of chemical dependency treatment facilities were addressed by
the collective bargaining agreement and represented limitations
on club and/or the Commissioner's right to change those
agreements .... [T]he Commissioner's rule-making authority
was supplanted, in certain respects, by specific agreement
language...which established clear procedures
concerning.. .testing.. .[The Players' Association has]
consistently resisted suggestions from the Commissioner...
which would have enlarged the scope of testinA for chemical
dependency by including "unscheduled" analyses.
The arbitrator also rejected the argument of the National Football
League Management Council ("NFLMC") that Rozelle's program would
not violate the prohibition on "spot-check" drug-testing because the
program would test all players randomly, as opposed to randomy selected
players. The 1982 Agreement clearly addressed this type of testing as
contrary to the Commissioner's intent.
97
The arbitrator ruled that the Commissioner did retain "integrity of the
game" authority under Article VIII. The Commissioner could exercise
some control by augmenting pre-existing drug-testing provisions related to
pre-season and "reasonable cause" testing, provided they did not violate the
terms of the 1982 Agreement.98 Because some terms of the drug program
were not specifically addressed in the agreement, the arbitrator allowed the
Commissioner to supplement these terms. For example, the 1982
Agreement did not give a precise definition of "prohibited substances" or
93. Thurston, supra note 41, at 122.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Lock, supra note 73, at 15.
98. David J. Sisson & Brian D. Trexell, The National Football League's Substance
Abuse Policy: Is Further Conflict between Players and Management Inevitable?, 2 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 1, 9 (1991).
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address the status of players hospitalized for drug treatment (for purposes
of pay and classification); thus, the Commissioner was allowed to address
these matters by imposing an "augmented" program.99
In another matter, Arbitrator Kagel, in Opinion & Decision In re
Arbitration between National Football League Management Council &
National Football League Players Ass'n Re: Post-Season Physical
Examinations, ruled that NFL management could not unilaterally
implement post-season drug-testing.) ° He stated that, because the NFL
and the Players' Association only bargained over: (1) pre-season and (2)
"reasonable cause" testing, any post-season testing violated the 1982
Collective Bargaining Agreement of the NFL. °10 Because the NFLMC did
not seek the capacity to. implement post-season drug-testing during the
course of collective bargaining, the arbitrator ruled that the League could
not implement it after-the-fact.' °2 The League used the "management
rights" clause to support its claim; the clause gave management the ability
to have unilateral control in areas not specifically limited in the agreement.
The NFL claimed that the NFLMC reserved the capacity to impose such a
program.' °3 The arbitrator did not accept the NFLMC's claim. The
agreement specifically limited the league's ability to test, thus the
Commissioner retained no residual rights with respect to other forms of
drug-testing. The "management rights" clause only applied to issues not
addressed in the 1982 agreement. 04  Neither arbitrator, however,
definitively decided whether drug- testing was a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, limiting their decisions to whether the provisions at
issue violated the respective NFL Agreement.
10 5
3. NLRB Decisions
The issue that the two 1986 arbitrations did not definitively decide
upon-the status of drug-testing as a subject of collective bargaining-
would be addressed and subsequently decided three years later by the
NLRB. Two decisions in 1989 by the NLRB held that drug-testing is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining over which employers are
required to fully bargain-the employer must seemingly bargain to
impasse. The NLRB in Johnson-Bateman Co. °6 and Minneapolis Star
99. Id.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 21.
106. 295 N.L.R.B. 180 (1989).
2002] DRUG-TESTING AS SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAUNING 453
Tribune'07 ruled that a drug-testing program is a "condition of
employment," and thus a mandatory subject of bargaining.
In the first impression case of Johnson-Bateman, the issue concerned a
concrete pipe manufacturer and his unionized production employees. The
Management's Rights clause of the contract stated,
[t]he management of the plant, direction of the working forces,
and work affairs of the Company, including but not limited to the
right.., to discipline or discharge for just cause.., to issue,
enforce and change Company rules [is reserved to the
Company] ... Thus, the Company reserves and retains, solely
and exclusively, all of the rights, privileges, and prerofatives
which it would have in the absence of this Agreement ....
Prior to the conduct at issue, provisions in the contract gave the
employer the right to discipline an employee for just cause, including for
consuming, possessing, or being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 109
Further, all employees had to undergo drug and alcohol testing at the time
of their hiring."o The employer then unilaterally imposed a program
whereby all workplace injuries requiring medical treatment would be
accompanied by drug and alcohol testing."' The employer's motivation
was the growing number of workplace accidents (perhaps due to the use of
drugs and alcohol), resulting in increased insurance rates. 2 The Board
determined that this issue did not fall under the understanding of a
"Company rule" within the scope of the Management's Rights clause, and
thus was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
113
The Board applied the two-part test of Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,'
4
where the Supreme Court held that a mandatory subject is "plainly germane
to the working environment" and "not among those 'managerial decisions
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.', 11 5 The drug-testing
requirement was "germane to the working environment" because a
violation of the policies could result in the discharge or other discipline of
the injured employee.1 6 This factor "is a condition of employment because
it has the potential to affect the continued employment of individuals who
become subject to it.,
117
107. 295 N.L.R.B. 543 (1989).
108. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. at 180.
109. Id. at 181.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 183.
113. Id. at 182.
114. 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
115. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. at 182.
116. Id. at 183.
117. Id.
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Also, the issue of drug-testing was not considered to be among those
managerial decisions that fall under the realm of "entrepreneurial
control.'. 8  The Board relied on Justice Stewart's concurrence in
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. in making this determination." 9 It
asserted that the imposition of a drug-testing policy is not entrepreneurial in
character; rather, it is a change in a vital part of the employees' regular
workday and "a change in personnel policy freighted with potentially
serious implications for the employees which in no way touches the
discretionary 'core of entrepreneurial control."",120 It does not involve the
investment capital or affect the fundamental scope and direction of the
enterprise, but "is rather a more limited decision directed toward reducing
workplace accidents and attendant insurance rates.'' Thus, it is treated as
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
In Minneapolis Star Tribune, the employer unilaterally implemented a
drug and alcohol policy consisting of three parts: a pre-employment
medical examination, drug and alcohol screening for current employees,
and a disciplinary schedule for offenses. 122  The Board affirmed the
decision in Johnson-Bateman that the unilateral implementation of a drug
program for current employees violates Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.1
However, a drug and alcohol-testing program for prospective employees
was not considered an unfair labor practice. 124
These decisions stand today and coincide with other Board decisions
holding that the implementation of testing programs for current employees
is considered a changed condition of employment, and thus is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. For example, in Medicenter, Mid-South
Hospital, a private employer's newly-implemented lie detector test for
current employees was held to be a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.' 25
4. NLRB, arbitration, and case precedents provide support for the
designation of drug-testing as a mandatory subject
The NLRB decisions of Johnson-Bateman and Minneapolis Star
Tribune (which are still as yet unchallenged) and the arbitration precedents
in both MLB and the NFL all consistently hold that drug-testing programs
cannot be unilaterally implemented and must involve collective bargaining.
118. Id.
119. Id..
120. Id. at 184.
121. Id.
122. Minneapolis Star Tribune v. NLRB, 295 N.L.R.B. 543, 543 (1989).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 221 N.L.R.B. 670 (1975).
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Since a drug-testing program will affect the athlete's "terms and conditions
of employment"--as defined by Section 8(d) of the NLRA-it should be
considered a mandatory subject. As such, the implementation of a drug-
testing program by the League may not be effectuated unilaterally without
prior bargaining with the MLBPA. There is no legal basis on which to
randomly test for drugs in the League.
The precedents reveal that "terms and conditions" has been interpreted
to mean most any matter that affects the employer-employee relationship,
especially issues that influence how employees perform their
responsibilities. 126 Thus, an issue like mandatory random drug-testing,
which implicates the mandatory subjects of (1) safety,1 27 (2) testing, 128 and
(3) disciplinary matters,' 29 is also considered a mandatory subject of
bargaining.
Further, an attempt to eliminate drug use in the League does not
constitute a decision tantamount to a change in the scope or direction of the
"business," as would an issue like the termination of a bargaining unit for
economic reasons (as in First National). The imposition of such a drug-
testing program would not alter the basic operation of professional baseball
or require a change in the capital structure of the League. The only
difference would be that random drug tests may detect illegal drug use by
individual players-the game would continue under its current form for all
intents and purposes. 3 ° There is no evidence that professional athletes'
drug use would have that great of an economic or structural effect on the
League.13 1 As the Board suggested in Johnston-Bateman, Fibreboard
required that, to be a permissive subject of bargaining, the issue must reach
the core of the employer's "entrepreneurial control"; drug- testing does not
reach that level in this employment context either. Also, as in Johnson-
Bateman, the issue of drug-testing in professional baseball is "plainly
germane to the working environment," in that a violation of any drug-
testing policy has the potential to drastically affect the ability of the athletes
to continue participation in the League (at least temporarily).
Also, the courts' and the Board's practice to look at industrial practice,
when determining whether something is a mandatory subject, also harms
the League's prospects of implementing this program unilaterally. The
Court in Fibreboard, for instance, supported its decision to require
collective bargaining by looking at industry practice. For the court,
126. Lock, supra note 73, at 25.
127. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964).
128. See Medicenter, Mid-S. Hop., 221 N.L.R.B. at 675-78.
129. See Robbins Door & Sash Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 659, 659 (1982) (holding that it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to implement a system of disciplinary rules upon its
employees without bargaining).
130. Lock, supra note 73, at 28.
131. Id.
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employer decisions to subcontract work outside the bargaining unit were
viewed as matters amenable to collective bargaining. 132 Current practice in
the field of professional sports demonstrates that drug-testing is indeed an
issue that collective bargaining can adequately address; the threshold issue
is addressing, not resolving, of which the former is accurately performed.
The joint agreements that have been created through collective bargaining
in the MLB, NFL, and NBA, regardless of whether current drug-testing
proposals are in effect, suggest that the issue of drug-testing is amenable to
treatment in collective bargaining by both parties in some fashion.
5. Limitations on Commissioner powers
The parameters of federal labor policy limit the League
Commissioner's authority to unilaterally implement a program such as
drug-testing. Labor law makes the collective bargaining agreement the
primary authority governing the terms and conditions of the employment
relationship. This fact precludes an employer or management from
changing particular terms without engaging in the process of collective
bargaining with union representation, acting to limit a commissioner's
role. 133 Even though the Commissioner is granted binding authority for
actions that affect the "preservation of the integrity of, or the maintenance
of public confidence in, the game of baseball," this provision has been
construed narrowly. 134  The intent was for this clause to apply to
misconduct such as gambling within the sport, and not for use or
possession of illegal drugs. Within the League, Commissioner-initiated
discipline for drug misconduct can be reviewed and even altered by a
neutral arbitrator. 35 Further, Article XI of the League's collective
bargaining agreement reserves for the players the right to reopen collective
bargaining on an issue where they deemed that the Commissioner exercised
authority in such a manner that contravened their own interpretation of the
agreement. 136
A case involving NFL management also supports this line of
reasoning. Commissioner Rozelle adopted a rule whereby any player
leaving the bench while a brawl was taking place on the field would be
fined. 137 Rozelle was precluded from promulgating this rule, which the
owners wanted implemented. 3  The Union argued that he could not
132. Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 210-15.
133. Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J., 167, 173
(1995).
134. Id. at 180.
135. Id. at 181.
136. Id. at 181 n.66.
137. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 13 (8th Cir. 1974).
138. Id.
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impose "bench fines" for this misconduct because the action was a
unilateral change of the terms and conditions of employment, and in
contravention of the collective bargaining agreement.13 9 The judge held
that the owners' unilateral implementation regarding this matter of
mandatory bargaining violated Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.140  The
"bench fines" could be deemed a reduction in salary, directly affecting the
terms and conditions of employment. Similarly, any discipline imposed
due to failing a random drug-testing would result in a reduction (or even a
forfeiture) of salary, similarly implicating the employment relationship in
such a manner that requires mandatory bargaining. The management of the
League is not granted any opportunity under the collective bargaining
agreement to act unilaterally on matters of such gravity as a drug-testing
program.
B. Arguments Proposed in Favor of Drug-Testing as a Permissive
Subject
1. The application of precedents should be cast in the light of
changed circumstances
Due to the changing world of professional athletics and the need for
MLB to exercise managerial control over the business, the authority of the
NLRB's decisions in 1989 should be reconsidered. Drug-testing should be
treated as a permissive subject of collective bargaining, allowing for
unilateral implementation of a drug-testing program. Despite the NLRB's
decisions in 1989, and Fibreboard prior to that, the changing times and
heightened issues of players' health and the sport's integrity lead to the
need for characterizing the issue as only a permissive subject. These
economic concerns have grown in importance in the last decade and thus
the NLRB's decisions regarding managerial prerogative should be
considered in this changing environment. In Justice Stewart's concurrence
in Fibreboard, he stated that rules regulating how employees perform their
job are considered terms and conditions of employment, including health
and safety protections at the workplace. 42 The concurrence further stated
that, "[w]hat one's hours are to be, what amount of work is expected...
[and] what safety practices are observed, would all seem conditions of
one's employment."' 43 Fibreboard could be refuted here because the drug
139. Id.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id. at 16 n.3, 17.
142. Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964).
143. Id.
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use that would be targeted would be conduct occurring off the field and
away from the job, and thus it does not implicate workplace concerns. The
Court specifically asserted that only rules regulating how employees
perform at the workplace are mandatory subjects.
In the Roberts arbitration, the arbitrator said that according to Article
II, any contractual clauses must be negotiated, except for special covenants
that provide benefits beyond those found in the Uniform Player's
Contract.'" Thus, the drug-testing clauses could potentially be valid, even
when unilaterally implemented, if they provide athletes with additional
actual or potential benefits. Ancillary benefits to these players include the
maintenance in public trust of the game and the protection of player health
and welfare. Further, the Kasher arbitration reserved to the
Commissioner an "integrity of the game" authority to augment MLB's
existing drug policy, which suggests that the drug concerns of the League
are indeed valuable.1
46
Under the First National balancing test, the Court held that chiefly
economic decisions involving a change in the scope and the direction of the
enterprise are reserved for management. 147 Decisions "essential for the
running of a profitable business" are not amenable to collective
bargaining.1 48  Within the League, the management-employer has a
legitimate interest in controlling drug use to protect its investment and the
job performance of its employees. Because the profitability of MLB is tied
to the success of players and fan support, the preservation of League
integrity through drug-testing is an issue that should thus be reserved for
managerial prerogative.
2. Commissioner powers
MLB's Major League Agreement, Article I, section iii, lays out the
functions of the Commissioner. They shall be to "investigate... any act,
transaction.., alleged or suspected to be not in the best interests of the
national game of baseball" and "to formulate.., the rules of procedure to
be observed by the Commissioner and all other parties in connection with
the discharge of his duties.' 49 The agreement gives the Commissioner the
power to reprimand, fine, suspend, or even expel a player who engages in
conduct that he deems as "not to be in the best interests of [b]aseball."'"5
144. Wong & Ensor, supra note 12, at 805 n.132.
145. Sisson & Trexell, supra note 98, at 9.
146. Id. at 10-12.
147. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
148. Id. at 679.
149. Rippey, supra note 34, at 147.
150. Id. at 170.
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Also, Rule 21 of the Major League Rules provides League management
with the ability to impose discipline for a variety of misconducts, including
betting on baseball games, attacking a player or an umpire during the game,
and giving gifts to umpires."' These parts of the basic League agreement
lend support for managerial prerogative based on the League's justified
desire to maintain the integrity of the game and the health of the players,
through being able to create a drug-testing program for the player-
employees. 52
3. Health and welfare concerns
The paramount reason advanced by management for imposing a drug-
testing program is to reduce the use of drugs by athletes, thereby protecting
the players' health. Another consideration is the health and well being of
the other athletes. By creating what is essentially a "drug-free workplace"
through mandatory testing, the risk of accidents to other players is reduced.
This argument is particularly compelling in a trade such as professional
athletics, considering the inherently physical nature of professional sports
and the vulnerability to injury that exists even under the most optimal
conditions. 153 Harm could come to either the drug user or one in contact
with him if the individual is not capable of performing a high-risk set of
tasks at the standard of care required of himself and expected by others.'1
4. Economic and contractual concerns
Similar to many other business institutions, the legal relationship in
professional sports is governed by contractual principles. In a contract for
providing a service, the employees' continuing physical ability to perform
is considered to be a prerequisite condition for payment.155 In signing the
basic player contract, a professional athlete represents himself as being in
good physical health and free of any condition that could hamper his
performance. This contract translates to a guarantee that the player is in a
state of physical well-being, such that he can endure the daily rigors
imposed on a professional athlete.156 Considering this employment context,
it is reasonable for the League to ensure through testing that the player
maintains an overall healthy state, which he represents himself to be in
151. Id. at 171.
152. Id. at 170.
153. Sisson & Trexell, supra note 98, at 10.
154. Id.
155. Jennifer L. Johnston, Is Mandatory HIV Testing of Professional Athletes Really the
Solution?, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 159, 170 (1994).
156. Id.
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upon entering his contract with the club.
Typically, in most employment contexts, an employer's
implementation of objective drug-testing is justified on economic grounds.
Management has a legitimate right to maximize the productivity of
employees and prevent any compromise of their ability to perform. Drug-
dependent employees tend to be less productive due to absenteeism and
more likely to endanger public safety. 157  In professional sports, in
particular, drug use is likely to result in: (1) athletes' irregular attendance at
practices and games; (2) sub-par performance due to their impaired state;
and (3) additional team costs incurred for the rehabilitation of players.
15
1
5. Maintaining the integrity of the sport
Because the viability of professional baseball is so connected with fan
support, there is a need by the League to maintain the integrity of the sport
through vehicles such as random drug-testing. Both the owners and the
League alike have the concern that increased drug use by MLB players
affects public confidence and trust in the sport. The essence of the MLB
Collective Bargaining Agreement Uniform Players' Contract also supports
managerial prerogative. It gives the Commissioner binding authority with
respect to action taken which involves the "preservation of the integrity of,
or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of baseball."' 59 The
League, after all, has a right to protect its investment.
The product market theory provides support for management to
unilaterally impose a drug program, with respect to its need to maintain the
integrity of the game. The theory excludes from mandatory bargaining all
management decisions that determine the nature, quantity, and marketing
of products."6 It proposes to exclude employees from bargaining over any
matters dealing with direct control over the product market.'6' Because
players' drug use can affect the image and quality of the "product" offered
on the market, the issue of drug-testing is at the core of entrepreneurial
control under the theory.
This theory essentially excludes safety issues as mandatory subjects in
situations where the employees themselves have created the risk that harms
the product. This theory is in direct opposition to the prevailing
interpretations of the NLRA where matters involving employee safety and
157. Deanne L. Ayers, Random Urinalysis: Violating the Athlete's Individual Rights?,
30 How. L.J. 93,93 (1987).
158. Id. at 95.
159. Stiglitz, supra note 132, at 180.
160. Lock, supra note 73, at 36-39.
161. Id. at 36.
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discipline are considered mandatory subjects. 62 With MLB, owners have a
legitimate interest in determining both the nature of the product of baseball
offered to the consumer/fan and the image of the sport. This is especially
the case with drug-testing, where the athletes' voluntary drug use is directly
creating the safety concerns with which the League is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
The precedents established by the 1989 NLRB rulings and a host of
sports arbitration decisions demonstrate that drug-testing must be a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, despite the changing treatment
and nature of professional sports in the last decade. As such, the decision
of whether and in what fashion to implement a drug-testing regime in the
League must be a mandatory subject of bargaining. While courts have
accepted a drug-testing program as binding when the employees implicitly
agree to the testing, 63 the objections brought by the MLBPA suggest that
no voluntary agreement to a random drug-testing program will be
imminent. It is not so much that the MLBPA is opposed to detecting drug
use, but that it has a great respect for the collective bargaining process.
Thus it would not support any unilateral implementation of a program that
would bypass its statutory right to bargain over such mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining.
162. Id. at37.
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